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In middle constructions the external argument is syntactically inactive, 
but is understood to be people in generaL But controversially it is 
optionally realized as a for-phrase which can denote a specific individuaL I 
propose that a for-phrase is indirectly associated with the implied agent. 
However, this does not explain the observation that middle constructions 
tend to be generiC. A middle verb itself is aspectually non-generic, but a 
middle construction is generic as a whole. This requires the presence of the 
generic operator. One thing missing is how a middle construction is 
guaranteed to be generic. I propose that the event argument is given the 
feature [ANY], which must be associated with the generic operator. My 
proposal could cause some problems in semantic interpretation, and I show 
~hat they can be avoided by existential disclosure. 
Key words: middle, generic, existential disclosure, implicit argument 
1. Introduction 
Verbs are roughly classified into transitives, intransitives, and unaccu-
satives, depending on whether they take an external argument, and 
whether they have an internal direct argument, in addition to the 
external argument)J 
* This work was financially supported by the 2001 Hongik University Research Grant. I would 
like to thank three reviewers for their comments and corrections. All remaining errors are 
mine. 
1) In the traditional descriptive grammar, the term "intransitive" is used in a more broad 
sense. That is, it may refer to intransitives and unaccusatives. In this paper, I use the 
term "unaccusative" in a more broad sense. There is some difference between the verb 
arrive and the verb sink. The term "unaccusative" is used to refer to verbs like arrive. 
These verbs allow there-construction, which motivates the assumption that the surface 
subjects occur after the verbs in D-structure. Verbs like sink have a causative counterpart 
which assigns accusative case. And even when they occur with only one argument 
realized, they do not allow there-construction. This motivates the assumption that the only 
argument is regarded as the external argument. Noting this difference, verbs like sink are 
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(1) a. John drives a car. 
b. John ran. 
c. John arrived. 
The verb drive is a transitive verb, the verb run an intransitive and the 
verb arrive an unaccusative. The distinction could be made structurally 
as well as in terms of their argument structures, because all arguments in 
the argument structure are projected to the syntactic structure, following 
the projection principle. 
Middle verbs do not seem to follow the projection principle strictly. 
They are generally assumed to have external arguments which are not 
realized in the syntax. 
(2) This car drives well. 
Even though the external argument of drive is not realized, this sentence 
does not mean that the car drives itself. It means that whoever drives the 
car, it moves well as the driver intends it to do. This implies that middles 
are semantically transitive verbs, even though they behave syntactically 
like intransitives or unaccusatives. For this reason, it is assumed that 
middles are derived from transitives. In some sense, they are in the 
"middle" between transitives and intransitives/unaccusatives.2) 
Middle verbs are "middle" in another sense. Most transitive verbs can 
be used in active forms or passive forms. 
(3) This car is driven by a car-racer. 
Compared with the sentences in (la) and (3), sentence (2) seems like a 
passive in its meaning, but the verb has the active form. In this sense 
middles are in the "middle" between actives and passives. Peculiar properties 
of middle constructions are hard to explain because of the dual properties. 
called ergatives. But there is another tradition III which both types are called 
unaccusative. In this paper, I am not concerned with how ergatives are analyzed, so I will 
also call them unaccusative. 
2) In middle constructions, the subjects are internal arguments of the corresponding 
transitive verbs, but they may be realized as external arguments or internal arguments in 
the syntax. Analyses of middle formation can be grouped into two in relation to either 
option. I will discuss this further below. 
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One peculiar property of middle constructions is that middles tend to 
be generic. Fagan (1988) attributes this property to the existence of the 
generic external argument. She claims that the external argument of a 
middle verb has arbitrary reference and that this arbitrariness makes the 
middle construction generic. But this is not empirically supported. In this 
paper, I am going to claim that generic nature of middle constructions 
should be accounted for by lexical and syntactic processes. Middle verbs 
themselves are not inherently generic. But they must be bound by the 
generic operator. More specifically, the event argument is bound by the 
existential operator in the lexicon, but the operator is licensed by a 
generic operator, just as a negative polarity item is licensed by some 
operator which licenses it. 
The paper goes in the following order. In section 2, I will compare 
middles with unaccusatives in order to show what properties middles 
have. In doing this, it is necessary to draw a strict line between middles 
and unaccusatives. I claim that middles have implicit external arguments, 
and that middle constructions are generic. In section 3, it will be shown 
that the implicit external argument may be expressed by a for-phrase, 
and that the for-phrase is not really generic, as Fagan (1988) claims. Here 
one controversial issue is whether the for-phrase is the direct realization 
of the external argument. I claim that it is indirectly associated with the 
external argument In section 4, I show that middle verbs themselves 
denote specific events. This leads to the idea that genericity of middle 
constructions should be explained by lexical and syntactic processes. To 
implement this idea, I use Dynamic Montague Grammar in section 5, 
where I show how generiC sentences are interpreted as generic. 
2 . Middles and Unaccusatives 
One of the ways to characterize middle constructions is to compare 
them with unaccusatives because they both are derived from transitives. 
The verb break can be used as a transitive, an unaccusative, and a 
middle. This is illustrated below: 
(4) a. John broke his leg. 
b. The bottle broke. 
c. The bottle breaks easily. 
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The verb break in (4b) and (4c) is derived from the transitive verb in 
(4a), but there is no difference in their forms. The only difference lies in 
their semantics. In (4b), we do not assume that there was someone who 
broke the bottle. Sentence (4c), on the other hand, means that whoever 
tries to break the bottle, it is broken easily by him/her}) 
Keyser and Roeper (1984) argue that the phrase all by itself/themselves 
is not compatible with the middle's implicit agent. This is illustrated in 
the following: 
(5) a. *French books read all by themselves. 
b. *This wood carves easily all by itself. 
The verbs read and carve imply the existence of the agent, so the use of 
all by itself/themselves is not allowed. Since unaccusatives do not have 
such implied agents, they are expected to come with the adverbial. 
(6) a. The door opens all by itself. 
b. Milk chocolate melts all by itself. 
The verbs open and melt are used as unaccusatives together with all by 
itself/themsel ves. 
Rapoport (1999) regards the sentences in (6) as middles, and claims that 
some middles do not have implied agents.4) Rapoport claims that agents 
3) The verb in (4c) also can be understood as an unaccusative. Fellbaum (1986) also makes 
this point. The following sentence can have two readings. 
(i) The door closes. 
One reading is a middle construal, which implies an agent. In this reading, it asserts the 
possibility of the door being closed by an agent. As an inchoative or an un accusative, the 
sentence simply describes the changing of the door's state from open to closed. In this 
reading, the sentence does not necessarily imply a human agent, but possibly suggests an 
external cause such as a draft in the room. 
4) According to this analysis, a verb which can be used with all by itself does not allow a 
for-PP, which Stroik (1992) claims to be the realization of. the implied agent. Rapoport takes 
the following sentences for example: 
(i) a. These comic books sell (easily) all by themselves. 
. b. "These books don't sell for the average shopkeeper. 
But the following sentences do not support the claim. 
(ii) a. These kinds of books just don't sell for any shopkeeper. 
b. These books won't sell for the average shopkeeper. 
It is not clear yet what role the negative polarity item any and the modal auxiliary will 
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are implied by verbs which have an inherent instrument or manner 
(l/M) component. The verbs in (6) lack this component, and they are 
generally taken to be unaccusatives. Then a question arises as to what 
the difference is between middles and unaccusatives. Middle constructions 
in general are generic sentences. But genericity is not itself a criterion of 
middles. Unaccusative verbs also can -be used generically. Even Rapoport 
himself says that a middle verb which can be used with all by itself can 
be used as an unaccusative, but it is not made clear what distinguishes 
middles from unaccusatives. 
Fellbaum (1986) also notes that sometimes middles can be used as 
unaccusatives. For these cases, he proposes a test. Fellbaum claims that 
middles and unaccusatives are distinguished by their relative positions 
with respect to adverbs. The following sentences are middles. 
(7) a. The car drives easily. 
b. *The car easily drives. 
c. The meat cuts nicely/easily. 
d. *The meat nicely/easily cuts. 
These sentences show that middle verbs cannot be preceded by adverbs. 
This is contrasted with unaccusatives: 
(8) a. The shutters easily close. 
b. Brass easily oxidizes. 
Fellbaum assumes that there are two distinct adverbs, easily! and easilyz. 
The first is one used in middles and the second in unaccusatives. Of 
course, one verb can come with either of them. Verbs like float, collapse 
and close are such examples. Even in these cases, Fellbaum claims, they 
are different in meaning. Easily! means 'with ease' or 'with no difficulty' 
while easilyz 'without much causation'. Only the former implies an agent 
of an event.S) 
play, but the verb sell comes with a for-PP. 
5) Fellbaum (1986) assumes that middle constructions are close to Tough-constructions in their 
meanings. He claims that only a sentence with easily! can be paraphrased with a tough 
movement sentence. 
(i) The door closes easilYl. 
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If verbs without implied agents are taken to be middles, the distinction 
between middles and unaccusatives becomes groundless. I take a middle 
to be a verb which has an implied agent. This is what traditional 
analyses of middle constructions have assumed. When a middle verb 
comes with all by itself/themselves, it is not a middle but an unaccusative. 
An additional test is to use a verb in denoting a specific event at a 
specific time. A middle construction is used to express a disposition of the 
subject. That is why middles generally come with simple present tense. 
(9) a. Chickens kill easily. 
b. *Chickens are killing. 
c. ?The chickens killed this morning. 
(10) a. The mayor bribes easily. 
b. ?*The mayor bribed yesterday, according to the newspaper. 
The middle verbs in (9b-c) and (lOb) are not natural with progressive or 
past tense with a specific time reference. On the other hand, unaccu-
satives can occur with a progressive aspect or past tense which refers to 
a specific point of time. 
(11) a. The door closed early this morning. 
b. The vase broke yesterday. 
c. The boat is sinking now. 
Progressive and past tense with specific time reference are, however, not 
a infallible test. It is also well-known that middles sometimes are used 
with progressive aspect or past tense with specific time reference. 
(12) a. The truck is handling smoothly. (Fellbaum, 1986, p. 4) 
b. The stakes you bought yesterday cut like butter. 
c. The paint we were persuaded to buy sprayed on evenly. 
These sentences apparently seem to pose a serious problem in analyzing 
middle constructions as expressing genericity. But we need to look at the 
~ The door is easy to close.' 
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examples more closely. Progressive aspect can express a dispositional 
meaning, and (12a) can be construed as expressing a generic property of 
the truck, even though it is a temporary one. (12b) and (l2c) express just 
specific events of cutting and spraying at specific points of time. The 
sentences in (12b, c) are true exceptions. 
One question is when such exceptions are allowed: I have no clear idea, 
but one speCUlation is that the duration in which the property denoted 
by the verb phrase holds is short due to the property itself. Notice that in 
(l2b-c) the subjects refer to specific entities, and that the predicates 
denote an event which cannot be repeated. In generic sentences, at least 
one variable is bound by the generic operator. But in the sentences in 
(l2b-c) there is no variable to be bound. In this case, it is impossible to 
express genericity. This can be supported by further examples. The 
following examples are from Iwata (1999, p. 530). 
(13) a. ~Yesterday, the mayor bribed easily, according to the newspaper. 
b. ~~At yesterday's house party, the kitchen wall painted easily. 
c. Grandpa went out to kill a chicken for dinner, but the chicken 
he selected didn't kill easily. 
d. The curry digested surprisingly easily last night. 
The event of bribing and painting can be repeated on the same object, 
but the event of killing and digesting cannot. In the latter case the 
subject must be nonspecific if the whole sentence is to be generic. But in 
(Bc-d) the subjects refer to a specific chicken and curry, and there is no 
variable to be bound by the generic operator. Only in this case do 
non-generic middles seem to be allowed. 
Similar evidence can be found in the following example: 
(14) a. John said Fred killed the chickens easily. (Roberts, 1987, p. 198, fn. 5) 
b. John said chicken_s killed easily. 
c. John said the chickens killed easily. 
The embedded clause is dependent on the matrix clause in their temporal 
relation in (14a), but not in (14b). That is, while the event of killing must 
precede John's saying in (14a), whereas the event of killing may be 
simultaneous with that of saying in (14b). This is because of the stativity 
(more precisely, genericity) of the embedded middle. The bare plural form 
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of the embedded subject is essential for the middle construal. In (14c), the 
temporal location of the event of killing is dependent on the time of 
saying: that is, the killing of the chickens precedes John's saying. Notice 
that killing cannot be repeated for the same object and does not provide 
a variable to be bound by the generic operator.6) The subject of the 
embedded clause does not provide a variable since it refers to a specific 
group of entities. So the embedded clause in (14c) cannot be used 
generically, and the event of killing precedes John's saying. In embedded 
clauses, only when there is a variable to be bound by the generic 
operator is the clause interpreted as generic?) 
6) Even when a middle construction comes with a temporal adverbial denoting a specific 
time, the property denoted by the verb phrase can be extended beyond the specified time. 
(i) Last week, chickens killed nicely. 
This sentence has a reading in which chickens being killed nicely can be extended beyond 
last week. The event denoted by a middle verb also can be extended with respect to space. 
(ii) a. 'The tent put up in John's backyard and then he invited everyone over for beer. 
b. The tent put up in John's backyard so it will put up in yours, too. 
In (iia), the sentence is odd because the disposition of the tent being put up is restricted to 
a specific space. But in (iib) the sentence implies that the disposition of being put up (well) 
is not restricted to a specific place but extendable to other places. This makes it acceptable. 
7) As a test for a middle, one could use the requirement of an adverbial. Middle constructions 
generally require VP-modifiers: 
(i) a. The wall paints '(easily). 
b. This language translates *( easily). 
In these sentences, the adverb easily seems obligatory. However, this seems to be related to 
informativeness. Some middle verbs can be used without adverbials when they are used 
with focus, negation, a modal auxiliary, or any. Cf. Fellbaum (1986), Roberts (1987) and 
Yeom (1989). 
(ii) a. This belt ADJUSTS. 
b. Chickens KILL. 
c. CHICKENS kill. 
d. This meat DOES cut. 
(iii) a. 'This meat cuts. 
b. This meat doesn't cut. 
c. Not many/Few bureaucrats bribe. 
(iv) a. 'This book sells. 
b. This book could sell. 
c. Any bureaucrat bribes. 
Focus, the negation, modality and any can convey extra information in addition to the 
meaning conveyed by the verbs. 
One reviewer points out that middle constructions allow a limited range of adverbials. It is 
well-known that agent-oriented adverbials are not allowed. This just follows from the 
observation that middle constructions denote some inherent property of the surface subject. 
Such a property must not be attributed to any property of the implied agent. From my 
observation, I speculate that an adverbial is possible only when it can contribute to the 
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From the discussion so far, I conclude that middles have implied agents, 
and that middle constructions express generic properties of their surface 
subjects. Some verbs can be used both as unaccusatives and as middles, 
but when they are used as middles, implicit agents are involved To the 
property of genericity, there are exceptions which can be predicted: they 
arise when the event variable cannot be bound by the generic operator 
because the event cannot be repeated for a single individual. 
3_ Implicit Arguments in Middles 
The implied agent of a middle construction was assumed to be inactive 
in syntax until Stroik (1992) claimed that it can be realized as a for-
phrase. Evidence for such an assumption is as follows: 
(15) a *The floor waxes easily by John/people. 
b. *This car drives carefully. 
c. *The book sells well to make money. 
d. *This car drives well drunk. 
When an agent is realized as an adjunct, it generally becomes a 
by-phrase. This is observed in passives and NPs. In (1Sa), however, the 
agent is not allowed to occur -as a by-phrase. The sentences in (lSb-d) 
contain an agent-oriented adverbial, a rationale clause and a secondary 
predicate adjunct which requires the external agent, and they are all 
ungrammatical. From this, it is quite natural to conclude that the 
external argument of a middle verb must be implicit and inactive in the 
syntax. 
Stroik (1992, 1995, 1999), however, claims that the external argument of 
a middle can be realized as a for-phrase, as follows: 
(16) a. Latin texts do not translate easily for Bill (Rapoport, 1999, p. 151) 
b. Physics books always read slowly for Lou. (Stroik, 1999. p. 120) 
c. Bureaucrats bribe easily for Bill. (Stroik, 1999, p. 121) 
inherent property of the surface subject, though it should be confirmed by further 
research. 
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If the for-phrase is really the realization of the external argument, then 
we can say that the external argument is demoted in the sense of Larson 
(1988).8) 
On the other hand, Zribi-Hertz (1993) and Ackema and Schoorlemmer 
(1995) argue against this idea. Their main claim is that the for-phrase is 
not the argument of the middle. I suppose that the main reason why 
they do not accept a for-phrase as the realization of the agent is that it is 
not the normal expression of agent. If the for-phrase really expresses the 
implied agent, a clear explanation must be given to the question why it 
is not realized as a by-phrase. Even Stroik gives no explanation. Ackema 
and Schoorlemmer (1995) also point out in a footnote that middles with a 
for-phrase are not quite acceptable by all native speakers. 
A second reason, which is related to the first, is that a for-phrase is not 
clearly characterized as an argument. Let's look at an example in Ackema 
and Schoorlemmer (1995, p. 179). 
(17) a. That book is too thick for Mary. 
b. As far as translation is concerned, no Latin text poses a 
problem for Bill. 
The NPs Bill and Mary are not arguments of the predicates pose and 
thick, respectively. The for-phrases seem to be used in relation to the 
8) As I discussed above, Rapoport (1999) claims that a verb with an inherent instrument or 
manner (I/M) component implies an agent. The implied agent is realized as a for-phrase. 
The following are examples of verbs with an I1M component. 
(i) a. (next to a line of poetry) Didn't/Doesn't translate into Polish (for me). 
b. This kind of cheese cuts (easily) for experienced cooks. 
These are compared with verbs with no I1M component: 
(ii) a. *This kind of glass breaks (easily) for our factory workers. 
b. *Milk chocolate won't melt for inexperienced cooks. (Rapoport, 1999, p. 153) 
Rapoport (1999) mentions in a footnote that these sentences can be grammatical for some, 
with the for-phrases interpreted as experiencer or point-of-view, even in non-generic 
reading: 
(iii) The chocolate melted for me, but not for you. 
But as I pointed out in the distinction between middles and unaccusatives, verbs without 
an I1M component can be regarded simply as unaccusatives. As Rapoport admitted, the use 
of a for-phrase is not a clear test for an implied agent. Verbs like sell and stow are 
regarded as middles by other linguists and allow a for-phrase. But Rapoport considers them 
as verbs with no I1M component. In spite of this incongruity, what Rapoport claims is that 
a for-phrase is the realization of the implied agent. 
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expression too in (17a) and the expression (pose a) problem in (17b), but 
they cannot be said to be arguments of any predicate. 
This suggests the possibility that a for-phrase in a middle construction 
is not directly related to the middle verb. Zribi-Hertz (1993) argues that 
for-phrases are 'point-of-view' adverbials and modify predicates of 
evaluative content. In middle constructions, they can be licensed by the 
evaluative content of the adverbials which come with middle verbs. Note 
that middle constructions are paraphrased into tough constructions in 
many cases, where for-phrases are licensed by the adjectives corre-
sponding to the adverbials. 
(18) a. Latin texts translate easily for Bill. 
b. Latin is easy (for John) to translate. 
It is, however, already mentioned that a middle can be used with no 
evaluative adverbial. Even in these cases, for-phrases are possible.9) 
This leads to a third reason why a for-phrase does not seem to be the 
direct realization of the implicit agent. The use of a modal auxiliary 
improves the middle sentence with a for-phrase. 
(19) a. (next to a line of poetry) Didn't/Doesn't translate into Polish 
(*for the average interpreter). 
b. (next to a line of poetry) Won't translate into Polish (for the 
average interpreter).lO) 
(20) a. These books don't sell (*for the average shopkeeper). 
b. These books won't sell for the average shopkeeper. 
(21) a. (on shoe chest) Stows on floor or shelf (*for tidy people). 
b. (on shoe chest) Should stow on floor or shelf for you. 
Middle constructions are inherently involved with modality, but the use 
9) It has been pointed out that modality and adverbials are closely related. Cf. Jackendoff 
(1972) and Cinque (1997). In particular, Cinque (1997) claims that adverbs like well are 
licensed by genericity. ThIs opens the possibility that adverbials in middle constructions 
are associated with the generic operator. 
10) Note that this tendency is observed in sentences with a verb which has an inherent I1M 
component like translate. An inherent I1M component does not guarantee a for-phrase. 
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of a modal auxiliary facilitates the occurrence of a for-phrase.ll) This fact 
implicates that the for-phrase is partly licensed by modality. One piece of 
evidence can be found in a control phenomenon when a passive is 
involved. 
(22) a. "The books were sold without PRO reading them (Chomsky, 
1982; Williams, 1985) 
h These books can be sold without PRO reading them (Chomsky, 
1982; Williams 1985) 
c. "The books might have been sold without PRO reading them 
(Kratzer, 1991) 
(22a) shows that the implicit argument of a passive does not control the 
PRO that follows, but (22b) is well-formed)2) The only difference is the 
use of a modal auxiliary in root modality. This shows that root modality 
contributes to making the implicit argument salient as a controller.B) (22c) 
also contains an modal auxiliary, but it is ungrammatical. The auxiliary 
verb in (22c) is used in epistemic modality)4) This shows that only root 
11) It is generally believed that genericity involves modality. Cohen (1999) tries to dispute this 
claim. In Yeom (2002), I show that Cohen's claim is not convincing. At least, his evidence 
does not prove that genericity does not involve modality. 
12) The implicit agent can control the subject of an infinitive rationale clause. 
(i) The wall was painted to protect it against the rain. 
This is adopted as an example which shows that the implied agent can control. It is, 
however, controversial whether the controller is the implied agent or the event argument. 
Williams (1985) and Lasnik (1985) are those who claim that it is the event argument. 
13) Newmeyer (1970) points out that a passive with a root modality auxiliary does not change 
meaning when the internal argument is inanimate. This shows that the modal auxiliary 
takes the implied/by-phrase subject as its semantic subject. 
(i) a. Visitors may pick flowers. 
b. Flowers may be picked by visitors. 
The two sentences have the same meaning, and permission is given to visitors in the 
passive too. This holds even when the by·phrase is not overtly expressed. 
14) In general, modality can be distinguished between root and epistemic modalities. The 
distinction can apply to the modality of possibility too. Leech (1971) distinguishes factual 
and theoretical possibility. These are illustrated as follows: 
(i) The road may be blocked. (factual possibility) 
= It is possible that the road is blocked. 
(ii) The road can be blocked. (theoretical possibility) 
= It is possible for the road to be blocked. 
Here factual possibility belongs to epistemic modality and theoretical possibility to root 
modality. 
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modality implies an argument. When it is combined with a predicate 
with an implied argument, it makes the implied argument more salient 
and active in syntactic phenomena. 
Without an adverbial or a modal auxiliary, some middle sentences with 
a for-phrase improve when this contains the expression an y)5) 
(23) a. (on shoe chest) Stows on floor or shelf (*for tidy people). 
b. (on shoe chest) Stows on floor or shelf for anyone with half a 
brain. 
(24) a. These books don't sell (*for the average shopkeeper). 
b. These books don't sell for any shopkeeper. 
Then why does any facilitate the use of the for-phrase? No one has ever 
given any explanation for this. A possible one may be that the expression 
also is closely related to modality. According to Kadmon and Landman 
(1993), free choice any is licensed by the generic operator. Middle 
constructions are assumed to have the generic operator, which will be 
discussed in detail below. But the occurrence of any seems to make the 
generic operator more salient or "stronger" enough to license a for-phrase 
because any requires the generic operator as its licenser. The point is 
that sometimes middle verbs alone may not be sufficient for the use of a 
for-phrase)6) Even though the evidence we have seen so far does not 
directly lead to a conclusion, we can see that the implied agent is 
realized as a for-phrase, but that modality is one factor that licenses it. So 
I take a for-phrase in a middle construction to be an argument of the 
complex predicate formed by a middle and modality (or some head 
which licenses the generic operator). This allows us to explain why a 
for-phrase behaves like the implied agent: it is the implied agent 
15) There ~re cases where any does not save for-phrases in middle constructions. The 
for-phrases in the following sentences are interpreted with different meanings than the 
implied agent.· 
(i) a. Smart bureaucrats don't bribe ftJr anyone. (Stroik, 1999, p. 121) 
b. Unwise bureaucrats will bribe for anyone. 
The preposition for in these sentences seems to be construed as 'on behalf of' rather than 
as the implied agent. 
16) Dayal (1998) claims that any is inherently modal. If this is correct, we can maintain that 
the use of a for-phrase is related to modality even if we cannot explain precisely how it is. 
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transferred from the argument structure of a middle verb to the complex 
predicate. Argument transfer will be expressed by coindexation. 
This also allows us to explain why the external argument of a middle 
verb is not realized as a by-phrase, but as a for-phrase. In a complex 
predicate construction, the actual realization of an argument is 
determined by the upper predicate. The agent of a middle verb is not 
simply an agent for the complex predicate. The complex predicate 
expresses the disposition of the surface subject. And disposition is a 
matter of degree relative to the agent who is involved in the events in 
which the disposition is actually observed. That is why the agents are 
realized as for-phrases. From this account we can conclude that 
for-phrases play dual roles: a phrase of a point-of-view and one associated 
with the implied agent. 
Stroik (1992, 1995, 1999) tries to show that a for-phrase is the direct 
realization of the external argument, by resorting to binding phenomena. 
Following Reinhart and Reuland's (1993) theory of reflexivity, which is 
given in (25), Stroik (1999) claims that a for-phrase is the realization. of 
the external argument of a middle verb. 
(25) Condition B: 
A reflexive semantic predicate is reflexive-marked. 
A semantic predicate consists of a predicate P and -its arguments, and a 
predicate is reflexive if two of its arguments are coindexed. If a predicate 
is to be reflexive-marked, one of the coindexed arguments is a SELF-
anaphor. One of the constructions which can test Condition B is a 
conjunction structure. An example of a middle construction is given in (26). 
(26) a. MarYl photographs well for Max and "her/herselfl 
b. (Mary photographs well for Max) & (MarYi photographs well 
*her/herselfa 
In (26a) the NP Max and her/herself as a whole can be an argument of 
the syntactic predicate photograph, but her or herself is not. But its 
semantic representation is like (26b), where Mary and her/herself are 
semantic co-arguments of the same predicate. So according to Condition B, 
the SELF-anaphor herself is the correct expression. But this is not 
absolute evidence for claiming that they are syntactic co-arguments, as 
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Stroik does. If a for-phrase is semantically associated with the external 
argument of the middle verb, which is what 1 am suggesting, the same 
result as in (26) will be obtained even if the for-phrase is not actually the 
direct realization of the external argument. The coindexation of a NP in a 
for-phrase with the surface subject has the effect of coindexing the 
implicit external argument with the surface subject and making the 
semantic predicate reflexive. 
4. What Genericity Comes From? 
Middle constructions are generic. 1 do not know of any attempt except 
Fagan (1988) to account for genericity of middle constructions. Following 
Rizzi's (1986) analysis of null objects in Italian, Fagan (1988) attempted to 
propose that a middle verb is derived by saturating the external 
argument, or giving it an arbitrary index in the lexicon. An arbitrary 
index means that the external argument is roughly understood as 'people 
in general'. This requires the middle verb to be generic. But this is not 
empirical supported. We can find examples in which the implied external 
argument is not 'people in general'. It is already mentioned that a 
for-phrase is indirectly associated with the external argument, and in (16) 
we have seen that the implied external argument can be a specific 
individual. They show that genericity in middle constructions cannot be 
attributed to the arbitrariness of the implied agent. 
~hen one could suggest that middles are inherently generic. If middle 
verbs were inherently generic, then they would be stative from the 
beginning. But middle verbs are different from other stative verbs. 
First, a middle verb can take an agent-oriented adverb if the derived 
subject is a possible secondary Agent while a stative cannot. 
(27) a. Harry seduces easily and willingly.l7) (Fellbaum, 1986) 
b. *1 know his name very well and willingly. 
17) An agent-oriented adverb is possible ol}ly when it is used with an adverbial which can 
occur by itself with a middle verb. So the following sentence is ungrammatical. 
(i) 'Harry seduces willingly. 
Roberts (1987) shows that a middle verb can be used with an agent-oriented adverb like 
voluntarily alone, but in that case the sentence shows all the properties of non-generic 
sentences. 
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Sentence (27a) expresses Harry's disposition, but the adverb willingly 
should be part of the disposition. Harry cannot, by his willingness, have 
the disposition of being seduced easily. So the agent-oriented adverb 
combines with the meaning of the verb seduce before the VP becomes a 
generic predicate. This shows that the middle verb is not inherently 
generic. 
Second, middles are compatible with resultative secondary predicates, 
while statives are not. 
(28) a. This bread cuts into thin slices easily. 
b. *1 like this bread into thin slices. 
A resultative secondary predicate only combines with accomplishment 
verbs, not with statives, or inherently generic predicates, as shown in 
(28b). 
Third, middle constructions are compatible with delimiting adverbials; 
statives are not: 
(29) a. The seat belt could adjust in a moment. 
b. This tent puts up in about two minutes. 
c. This cereal prepares in your bowl instantly. 
(30) ??I know his name in a moment. 
The fact that resultatives and delimiting adverbials can be used in middle 
constructions implies that middle verbs are not generic themselves. A 
natural assumption is that there is a generic operator which makes the 
eventive predicate into a generic one. 
Except for sentences with inherently generic predicates, which are 
generally called individual-level predicates, a generic sentence contains a 
generic operator which binds some variables within its scope. So a 
generic sentence has the following semantic structure: 
Here a variable Xi (1:::;; i:::;; n) can be an event variable introduced by a 
verb. If there is no bound variable, then the sentence is semantically an 
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anomaly. From this restriction on generic sentences, we can show that 
middles are not inherently generic. 
Consider the following examples. 
(32) a. The mayor bribes easily. 
b. The letters transpose easily. 
c. The floor paints nicely. 
d. Harry seduces easily. 
These sentences are fine because the event variables introduced by the 
verbs can be bound by the generic operator. For example, the rough 
semantic interpretation of (32a) is as follows: 
(33) Gens [m is in s1 :3 x[bribe(s)(m)(x) /\ easy(s)] 
Here I assume that the definite NP denotes an individual. The verb bribe 
provides an event variable s which can be bound by the generic operator. 
Consider the following example. 
(34) a. ??The mayor kills easily. 
b. Gens[m is in s] :3x[kill(s)(m)(x)/\easy(s)] 
(34b) is the semantic representation of (34a). Apparently (34b) seems fine, 
but actually the variable s is not bound by the generic operator because 
the death of an individual cannot be repeated. There is no other variable 
that the generic operator can practically bind. This makes the sentence 
odd. This shows that a middle verb is not inherently generic, as 
individual-level predicates are. 
I have shown that a middle verb is non-generic and forms a 
non-generic VP with a delimiter or a resultative secondary predicate. On 
the other hand, some adjuncts in middle constructions are licensed by 
geIleric predicates. This implies that there is some larger generic phrase 
with some non-generic predicate inside. As van Oosten (1977) points out, 
rationale clauses in middle constructions must modify generic properties, 
not specific events. 
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(35) a. The clothes wash with no trouble because 
(i) they are machine-washable. 
(ii) (??)I have lots of time. 
b. It is not trouble to wash the clothes because 
(i) they're machine-washable. 
(ii) I have lots of time. 
(36) a. "The ceiling in this room touches easily because I have a tall 
ladder. 
b. The ceiling in this room is easy to touch because I have a tall 
ladder. 
In (35a) the reason must be given for the generic property of the clothes 
being washed with no trouble, not about a specific event of being 
washed with no trouble. (35b) is not a middle construction and allows a 
reason for a specific event of washing the clothes. The same explanation 
can be given to the difference of the two sentences in (36). Note that a 
tough construction, which is assumed to have a similar meaning to a 
middle construction, allows a reason for a specific event, unlike a middle 
construction. 
I have claimed that a for-phrase is licensed by a complex predicate 
with modality. This means that a for-phrase is not an adjunct to the VP 
which denotes an instantaneous event, but one to a generic predicate, a 
larger constituent. This can be confirmed by scope relation. Consider the 
following sentence. 
(37) No Latin text translates easily for Bill. 
If the for-phrase were in the VP and part of the inherent disposition of 
Latin texts, this sentence would mean that there is no Latin text that has 
the (inherent) disposition of 'being translated easily by Bill'. The intended 
meaning, however, is that for Bill no Latin text shows the disposition of 
'being translated easily'. The for-phrase is not part of the disposition. This 
requires the for-phrase to be somewhere above the VP. Here the implied 
agent is understood to be Bill, but this is not because the for-phrase is 
part of the disposition, but because the implied agent is coindexed with 
the NP in the for-phrase by argument transfer. 
We can observe the same readings for the following sentence. 
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(38) These books don't sell for any shopkeeper. 
If the for-phrase is within VP, the sentence is expected to have the 
reading (39a). If it is outside VP, then the sentence is expected to have 
the reading (39b). 
(39) a. These books have the disposition of not being sold by any 
shopkeeper. 
b. For no shopkeeper, these books sell (well). 
Between these two readings, the second one is the meaning of sentence 
(38))8) As the structure shows, the for-phrase is not part of the disposition 
expressed by the generic predicate, but expresses the point of view from 
which the generic property is considered. Even in this case the implied 
agent of selling is taken to be each shopkeeper. 
The discussion so far shows that there should be two layers in terms of 
aspect. Middle verbs are not inherently generic. VPs with middle verbs 
denote specific events, and larger phrases are generic. Some modifiers are 
used f~r the non-generic predicates and others for the generic predicates. 
Non-generic predicates can become generiC only with the help of the 
generic operator or the modality which has a similar meaning. 
Then the next question is how the generic nature of middle 
constructions is ensured. How are non-generic predicates associated with 
the generic operator in a non-accidental way? I suggest that middle verbs 
are lexically derived by giving the event argument some feature, in 
addition to the suppression of the external argument, and that the 
feature is licensed by being associated with the generic operator in the 
syntax)9) I will simply represent the feature as [ANY]. According to 
18) This can be given as a piece of evidence that the for-phrase is not the direct realization of 
the external argument. One thing I want to point out is that any NP is not licensed by the 
negation but by some other syntactic and semantic element like modality. We can find 
examples of middle constructions in which any comes with no negation. 
(i) (on shoe chest) Stows on floor or shelf for anyone with half a brain. 
19) A similar analysis is proposed for i(ndividual)-level predicates. Chierchia (1995) poses a 
problem with the idea that i-level predicates are inherently generic. Chierchia (1995) gives 
two examples to show this. 
(i) a. Sheep are black or white. 
b. Cats like themselves. 
Sentence (ia) can be roughly paraphrased as follows: 
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Kadmon and Landman (1993), any eN is just an indefinite and so it is 
interpreted as the existential quantifier, but any has the effect of 
widening the domain for the interpretation of the NP. It is licensed only 
if the widening of the domain creates a stronger meaning. Then we could 
define the meaning of [ANY] as the effect of widening the domain for 
the existential quantifier. Free choice any is also subsumed under the 
same analysis. The only difference is that it is bound by the generic 
operator. Such a free choice interpretation is what is observed in middle 
constructions. So the feature [ANY] is just like the free choice any. In 
conclusion, middle formation involves two processes. The external 
argument is suppressed and the event argument is given the feature 
[ANY], which makes it bound by the generic operator. The feature itself 
does not make the verb generic. 
Sometimes middle verbs may be used in non-generic readings. As I said, 
they are used as such because the event argument cannot be bound by 
the generic operator. If the feature [ANY] is not to be given to the event 
argument of a verb, it should be predicted in the lexicon. Note that the 
feature is assigned in the lexicon, and that exceptions can be predicted 
from the inherent meaning of the verbs. Whether or not the feature can 
be assigned to the event argument can be predicted in the lexicon. Even 
when the event argument is given the feature [ANY], it loses the force of 
free choice. In this case I am not sure what is the ultimate effect of the 
feature. I claimed that even when a middle verb denotes a simple event, 
that event occurs as a manifestation of an inherent property of the 
surface subject. This may be closely related to the assignment of the 
feature. 
(ii) Every cat is black or white. 
But if i-level predicates were inherently generic, the complex i-level predicate black or 
white would be roughly paraphrased as 'generally black or generally white'. Then the 
sentence would have the following reading. 
(iii) Sheep are black or sheep are white. 
To get the natural reading of the sentence, the generic operator must be introduced over 
the disjunction of the two i-level predicates and this disjunction must be predicated of each 
sheep. Similarly, sentence '(ib) has the following meaning. 
(iv) Gen X,S[x';;Rcats /\ C(x,s)][like(x,x,s)] 
That is, to get the right reading, the generic operator must combine with the reflexive 
predicate. If the verb like is inhelently generic, this reading is hard to get. 
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5. Analysis of Middle Constructions 
5.1. Syntactic Structures of Middle Constructions 
I will adopt a run-of-the-mill version of the Principles and Parameters 
framework, where S-structure is mapped into LF via Move- a. LF feeds 
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I assume the VP-internal subject hypothesis, so the subject of a sentence 
occurs in the specifier position of VP and moves to the specifier position 
of IP. I also assume Asp(ectual) P(hrase) just above VP, following Tenny 
(1987) and Chierchia (1995). If the head is [+Hab(itual)], the sentence 
becomes generic with the generic operator at the specifier position of 
AspP.20) The simple feature [+Hab] is not sufficient to express that middle 
20) Cinque (1997) claims that this head carries a feature [±progressive]. Here [+progressive] is a 
marked value, and [-progressive] is taken to be generic. Genericity is in complementary 
distribution with progressive aspect. For this reason, Cinque suggests that genericity and 
progressive aspect head the same syntactic projection and that they differ with respect to 
the feature of that projection. Cinque assumes an additional phrase between AspP and VP, 
together with many other function categories related to various types of adverbials. Cinque 
basically assumes that adverbs are licensed in the specifier positions of separate functional 
maximal categories. Especially manner adverbials are assumed to occur in the Voic(e) 
P(hrase), which occurs just above VP. We know that middle constructions occur with 
manner adverbs like easily, well, nicely, smoothly, etc. But in English, middle voice is 
formed in the lexicon, so does not need a syntactic position for an overt morpheme of 
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constructions convey inherent properties of the surface subjects, it is not 
clear yet whether we need to assume different operators for different 
types of genericity, or whether the inherent properties are captured in 
some other way. 
To interpret a middle construction which contains the generic operator 
between the IP and the VP, there should be a mapping rule from a 
syntactic structure to the semantic representation. I assume that the 
material outside the VP is mapped into the restrictor of the generic 
operator, and the rest into the nucleus scope. The subject can go into the 
nucleus scope if it is lowered to the specifier position of the VP, but 
middle constructions normally express the subjects' dispositions. 
I assume that a for-phrase, which is indirectly associated with the 
implied agent, is assumed to be adjoined to the AspP because it is 
regarded as the argument of a complex predicate which consists of a 
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<e, Ai, Th> 
Here the middle verb has three arguments <e, A(gent), Th(eme». The 
agent is suppressed, and so not realized within the VP. When the VP is 
combined with the feature [+Hab] in Asp, the agent is transferred to the 
complex predicate the syntactic head of which is the feature [+Hab]. The 
feature does not select an argument directly so the agent is realized as a 
for-phrase. The argument transfer is represented as a coindexation. The 
middle voice. So I ignore VoicP. 
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reason for giving the index to P is just technical. This will be discussed 
below, Since a for-phrase is adjoined to AspP, it is always mapped into 
the restrictor of the generic operator. 
5.2. Semantic Interpretation of Middle Constructions 
In my analysis, the external argument of a middle is lexically saturated 
in the lexicon and is optionally realized as a for-phrase as an argument 
of the complex predicate. Once the implied agent is lexically suppressed, 
how is the agent bound by an overt argument? Syntactically this is an 
argument transfer. But this process must be explained semantically too. In 
addition, the implied agent can be specific when realized as a for-phrase 
with a proper name, but when there is no for-phrase, the implied agent 
is construed as 'people in general'. This should be explained in the 
interpretation of a middle construction. Another phenomenon that should 
be discussed in semantic interpretation of middle constructions is how 
the event argument is bound by the generic operator when it is given 
the feature [ANY]. If an event argument is given the feature [ANY] and if 
[ANY] is construed as the existential operator, it means that the argument 
is bound by the existential quantifier. If a variable bound by the 
existential quantifier is to be bound by another operator, the binding of 
the existential quantifier must be broken. This is what Dekker (1993) calls 
existential disclosure. In static semantics, existential disclosure cannot be 
captured. In this paper, I assume a slightly modified version of the 
Dynamic Montague Grammar (= DMG) because in this framework the 
correspondence between dynamic meaning and static meaning can be 
shown easily. 
In a static theory of meaning, the basic types are e and t. In DMG, the 
basic types are c =<S, e:> and r =<S, «S, t>, 1». For the dynamic meaning 
of a sentence, the up arrow is introduced as a type-shifting operation. It 
changes the meaning of an _expression from a type expressed by e and t 
into a new type by replacing each e and t by c and r respectively. The 
t rjJ of a sentence rjJ is of type <S, «S, 1>, t». If rjJ is true in state s, t rjJ 
denotes the set of all true propositions in s. If rjJ is false, then t rjJ is the 
empty set. From the dynamic interpretation of a sentence, we can get the 
truth-condition (= static content) of that sentence by the down arrow 
operator L which is given in the Appendix. The meaning of type <S, a> 
is a function from states (or, assignments) to the meanings of type a 
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with respect to each state. Each lexical item is associated with the 
meaning of a certain logical type. A sentence has the type of r. I assume 
following Davidson (1967) and Parsons (1990) that all verbs have a 
situation argument, whether an event or a state. All I-place predicates are 
of type < c, r >. An NP has the semantic type of «c, r >, r >. 
In DMG, expressions in natural language are translated into dynamic 
intensional logic (= DIL). In this language variables x, y, ... are distin-
guished from discourse referents db d2, •••• Variables are used even though 
they are not actually used in discourse: they do not have counterparts in 
natural language. This language employs tl -abstraction and the dynamic 
counterparts of identity (;;:), 'be a realization of' relation (::;;R), negation 
( -), and the existential quantifier (Ed). 
Now let's see how a middle construction is interpreted within the DMG. 
The external argument of a middle verb is suppressed in the lexicon. 
Arguments like this are assumed to be existentially closed in the lexicon. 
This is not peculiar to middle verbs. Passives do not require the external 
arguments to be realized in the syntax, but the implicit arguments 
optionally occur as by-phrases. Suppose that a passive is compositionally 
interpreted. We do not know whether a by-phrase occurs at a higher 
node. The only way to interpret the verb is to assume first that the 
implicit argument is assumed to be someone or something given in the 
context. Later it is identified with the one introduced by an overt 
by-phrase. Dekker (1993) generalizes this into all optional arguments. 
Now let's look at a concrete example. 
(42) a. A captain whistles. 
b. A captain oh the Enterprise whistles. 
The common noun captain is relational, so basically it has two 
arguments. But in (42a) one optional argument is not realized, in which 
case it is assumed to be bound by the existential quantifier. This is 
represented as follows: 
captain ~ A xEd2 l' captain_of( l' d2)(x) 
Even when we interpret (42b) compositionally, we must do the same 
thing with the noun captain, because we do not know if the optional 
argument is realized somewhere after the noun is interpreted. When the 
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optional argument is interpreted, it must bind the variable which has 
been bound by the existential operator. This is done by the process of 
existential disclosure given below: 
(43) Existential disclosure: 
{i xlddet>(=[et>1 ; (i x~ i d1)]) 
Dekker (1993) takes this to be equivalent to [et> 1 ; ( i x~ i dz)]. This has the 
effect of replacing every instance of variable di with x. In (42b) 
existential disclosure applies when the preposition of is interpreted. Here 
the index 2 is given to the implicit argument of captain and the overt 
argument of the Enterprise. For a technical reason, the index is actually 
given to the preposition rather than the NP. 
of "--+ AT,.tPAx i t 1{A y{ i yl dz}I{x)) 
the Enterprise "--+ AQ ex i enterprise) 
captain of the Enterprise "--+ A TAPA x i t 1{A y{ i yldz}I{x)) 
(A Q ex i enterprise))(AxEdz i captain_of( i d2)(X)) 
= AX i t ( i enterprisel d2}Edz i captain_of( i dz)(x) 
= AX i t [Edz i captain_of( i d2)(x); i enterprise ~ i d2] 
(Existential disclosure)21) 
Here dz is bound by the existential operator, so the referent is not fixed, 
but it is equated with an individual 'the Enterprise'. So the existential 
operator loses its force as an operator. 
A similar process is necessary in middle constructions. The event 
argument in a middle construction is given the feature [ANY]: that is, the 
event variable is bound by the existential quantifier. However, the event 
argument must be bound by the generic operator. So this is where 
existential disclosure comes in. Let's look at a concrete example. 
21) In this formula, the second d2 is dynamically bound by the existential operator. It can be 
shown that the variable is staticaliy bound using equivalence relations given in the 
Appendix: 
,Ix i ~ Ed2!: i captain_of (i d2)(x); i enterprise;;; i d2] (associativity) 
= ,Ix i ~ Ed2!: i captain_of (d2)( ~ x); i (~ i) enterprise;;; ~ i d2)] (i -export) 
= ,Ix i 3 d2!:(captain_of (d2)( ~ x) 1\ enterprise ;;;d2)] ( i-import) 
= ,Ix i (captain_of (enterprise)( ~ x)) 
1176 Yeom, Jae-II 
(44) Harry Cen bribes easily_ 
For the interpretation of this sentence we need the following interpre-
tation rule: 
(45) [IPNPz, .. ,XPj Geni,j,l [vP ... ]],--+ 
G x •• ... ,X"X, [ 11 NP, 11 ( A }{ t X,<::::RYJ)J,···; 11 XP,II (A }{ t Xj<::::R t y]) 
[{ t XII dilll VP 11 (X,)] 
The generic operator binds variables unselectively. The binding relations 
are expressed by coindexation in syntax. What the interpretation rule 
does is map the material within VP into the nucleus scope and that 
outside VP into the restrictor.22) In the nucleus scope, {t xII dd leads to 
the existential disclosure. This is what makes the event variable bound 
by the generic operator. The event variable is bound by the existential 
operator within VP. But existential disclosure replaces the existentially 
bound variable dl with Xl, which is in turn bound by the generic 
operator. This makes the existential operator lose its force as a binder. 
Since the generic operator binds unselectively, it is very hard to derive 
the meaning of a sentence in a strictly compositional way. So the 
interpretation of the generic operator is given as a rule for an overall IP 
structure.23) The subject NP may be a proper name, but it also may be an 
indefinite or a kind-denoting NP. To cover these cases, we need to 
assume that the subject NP is of type «e, r >, r >. But an NP above the 
generic operator must be converted into a type of r so that it becomes 
part of the restrictor with one or more variables bound by the generic 
operator. For this reason, A}{ t Xi<::::R t y] is given to the interpretation of 
the NP: we use the relation <::::R 'be a realization of' because the subject 
NP may quantify over individuals or kinds. Cf. Chierchia (1995). Let's look 
at the interpretation of (44): 
22) Diesing (1992) and Kratzer (1989) take a similar strategy for interpreting generic sentences 
with bare plurals. 
23) The reason is that the generic operator cannot be given a fixed semantic type in this case. 
A normal type of an operator is «c, r >, «c, r >, r », but when the generic operator is 
of the same type and combines with a VP, it can take one predicate. But an NP is not a 
predicate. Even if it can take a predicate derived from one NP, it should combine other 
NPs, which is impossible. The interpretation rule for an overall JP structure can allow us to 
avoid this problem. 
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(46) bribe ~ ).xEd£dj t bribe (t dz)(x)( t d}) 
easilyz ~ ).P). x(F{x); t] easy ( t dD] 
bribe easily ~ ?x(EdzEdj t bribe ( t di)(X)( t dj}; t easy (t d;)] 
Harry ~ ).P F{h) 
Harry bribes easily ~ 
G Xk. X,[?' P F{h) (? y[ t Xk:S:Rt y])] 
[{ t xsl dd( ).x(EdzEd} t bribe ( t dz)(x)( id}); t easy (t dZ)])(Xk)] 
= G Xk. X , [ t Xk:S:R t h][{ t xsI dzl(EdzEd} t bribe ( t dz)(h)( t dj); 
t easy (t dz))] (). -conversion) 
= G xJc(h, xs)][EdzDdj t bribe ( t dz)(h)( id}); 
i easy (t dz) ; i Xs~ i dz] (Existential disclosure) 
= G xJC(h), xs][Edj i bribee i xs)(h) i dj}; i easy( i xs)] 
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Here the value of the variable Xk is a realization of Harry. Then it 
becomes Harry itself. So it is not a variable any more. The variable for 
the event argument dz is originally bound by the existential quantifier. 
But the existential disclosure {t xsl dzl adds the formula t Xs~ t dz at the 
end of the nucleus scope. This has the effect of replacing the variable dz 
with Xs- And the latter is bound by the generic operator. Thus the 
variable originally bound by the existential quantifier gets bound by the 
generic operator indirectly. 
In (46) I have ignored the effect of the feature [ANY]. As I pointed out 
above, a middle verb must be associated with the generic operator or 
some type of modality. I have proposed that the event argument of a 
middle verb is given the feature [ANY]. As Kadmon and Landman (1993) 
claimed, any has the effect of widening the domain of quantification 
beyond the contextually given set of relevant individuals. This is related 
to the notion of arbitrariness (Lee, 1996) or contextual vagueness (Dayal 
1998). If a quantifier is to be interpreted in an extended context with a 
widened domain for the quantifier, it needs an operator which can 
introduce an extended context, other than the given context. This 
motivates the generic/modal operator to come in here. Especially in our 
analysis, the generic operator replaces the existential quantifier as the 
binder of the same variable, so the domain for the generic operator must 
be at least as large as that of the existential quantifier. Let's assume that 
the domain for a quantifier is defined by the context, and that C* is the 
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widened context for the event variable. Then the existential disclosure in 
the interpretation of sentence (44) will be as follows: 
bribe ~ ,1.xEdiEC*Edjl bribe et da(x)( I dj) 
Harry bribes easily ~ 
Gx,.x, [I Xk~R I h][{ I xs/dd(EdiEC*Ed] i bribe (I dD(h)( i dj); 
easy (I dd)] 
= G x,[C(h, xs)][EdiEC*Edj I bribe( I dz)(h)( I dj); 
easy (i dz]; I Xs~ i dz) 
Here xs~dz can be satisfied if the domains for dz and Xs are the same: the 
operator that binds Xs must be something that quantifies over individuals 
in the widened context. This is possible when Xs is bound by the generic 
operator, which can introduce individuals which are not given in the 
actual context. This is the reason why the feature [ANY] requires an 
operator like the generic operator. 
We know that the external argument is implied in middle 
constructions. The lexically saturated argument is semantically an 
argument bound by the existential quantifier. In (46) the external 
argument is still bound by the existential quantifier, but it does not 
mean that there is one particular agent involved in the event of bribing. 
There are multiple situations of bribing and for each situation there is an 
agent who bribes Harry. Since there is an unlimited number of situations, 
there can be an unlimited number of agents. This seems to be the reason 
why the agent is understood as 'people in general'. But note that the 
sentence is not about people in general. This makes it possible to get a 
middle construction in which the external argument is bound by a 
proper name. 
Now let's see how the external argument is bound by a specific 
individual. One difficulty is that the overt argument in the form of a 
for-phrase is mapped into the restrictor and the implied agent is 
existentially closed in the nucleus scope. The two arguments are 
coindexed representing an argument transfer. When the for-phrase is 
added to the sentence, it is mapped into the restrictor and at the same 
time it must open up the previously existentially closed argument in the 
nucleus scope. Take a concrete example. 
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(47) Latin texts translate easily for Bill. 








NP Asp' P, NP 
I /~ I I 
Geni,j,k Asp VP forj Bill 
I ~ 
[+Hab] NP V' 
I ~ 





Without the for-phrase, the sentence would have the meaning in (49a), 
and the addition of the for-phrase changes it into (49b). 
(49) a. Gxk,x,[txkS:RlIatin_textsAC(xk,xs)] 
[EdiE C*Edj i translate( i dD(Xk)( t dj); 
t easy( i dD; t Xs~ t dz] 
b. GXk,Xl,XJ t XkS;R t latin_texts A t poinLoLview(XI)AC:tXk,XI,Xs) 
[EdtEC*Edj i translate( t dD(Xk)( t dj); 
i easy( t di); t Xs~ t dt; t Xl= t d,] 
In the interpretation, the meaning of for is simply expressed as a 
monadic predicate 'point_oLview'. The for-phrase introduces a variable Xl 
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which is bound by the generic operator in the restrictor, but it also 
introduces an equation t Xl= t dj in the nucleus scope. This is possible 
only when existential disclosure applies non-locally across the border 
between the restrictor and nucleus scope. This is not necessary only for 
the interpretation of a for-phrase. When a middle construction is 
interpreted, the event argument of a verb is existentially closed at the 
beginning. But later it is bound by the generic operator via existential 
disclosure. This is why I t XII dz) is in the interpretation rule in (45). To 
deal with a for-phrase, we need to modify the interpretation rule in (45) 
as follows: 
(45') [IP Np i,···, XPj Geni,j,l [vP ... ]] ~ 
G x; ••..• X;.X/ [ 11 NPi 11 (;l y[ t XC::;;RyJ), ... ; 11 XPj 11 (;l y[ t Xj::;;R t yJ)] 
[I t x/ddl t xldj}{ t xl/dzjll VP 11 (xa] 
I added I t Xii dd and I t xl dj\ in the nucleus scope, generalizing 
existential disclosure to all variables bound by the generic operator. If a 
variable is not bound by an existential quantifier in the nucleus scope, 
existential disclosure applies vacuously, which does no harm. The new 
interpretation rule ensures the interpretation of (47) to be (49b). 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper, I have proposed that middle formation involves both 
lexical and syntactic processes. The suppression of the external argument 
occurs in the lexicon, but this is not sufficient to explain why middle 
constructions are generic. I propose another lexical process which assigns 
a feature [ANY] to the event argument. This must be associated with the 
generic operator in the syntax. I motivated this analysis by showing that 
a middle verb itself is not a generic predicate, and that it can combine 
with adverbials which occur only with non-generic predicates. I also 
showed that in a middle construction, the implied agent does not have to 
be people in general, as Fagan (1988) claimed. In showing this I propose 
that a for-phrase in a middle construction is an argument of a complex 
predicate. This can explain why the status of a for-phrase is controversial. 
It is associated with the implied agent by argument transfer. So it 
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behaves like the implied agent. On the other hand, it convey the 
meaning of 'point-of-view' because it is realized as an argument of a 
complex generic predicate which can be relativized to individuals. 
This analysis poses difficulties in semantic interpretation of middle 
constructions. The feature [ANY], which is given to the event argument, 
can be interpreted as the existential quantifier, but the event argument 
must be bound by the generic operator in the syntax. A for-phrase is the 
implied agent which is existentially bound in the interpretation of a 
middle verb, but it must go into the restrictor of the generic operator and 
dynamically bind the existentially bound agent in the nucleus scope. This 
is dealt with by the notion of existential disclosure. Existential disclosure 
in this paper is non-local in some sense, but Dekker (1993) does not deal 
with cases like this. We need to find out how far existential disclosure 
can be extended in a future study. 
Chierchia (1995) proposed a similar analysis of individual-level 
predicates as being bound by the generic operator somewhere outside. 
But one clear difference between individual-level predicates and middle 
verbs is that individual-level predicates are inherently generic while 
middle verbs are not. For this reason, he proposed that the generic 
operator be introduced at a strictly local position. But it is still to be 
explained why individual-level predicates are generic even before they 
combine with the operator. If my analysis is on the right track, 
inherently generic predicates seem to require a different analysis. 
Appendix 
Definitions for conversion from DMG into DIL: 
1. (A -conversion) 
( A X,8)( cd~[ a/X],8 (provided all free variables in a are free for x in 
,8) 
([ a/X],8) is obtained by replacing all free occurrences of x in ,8 by 
a.) 
2. ( t -export) 
et ,8)( a )~ tC,8 et a)) 
a~,8~tU a- ~,8) 
-([)~t---,~([) 
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3. (~-import) 
~ t ~~ ~ 
~Ed([)~:Jd~ ([) 
H t ~ ;1Jf]~Ct ~ ~ 1\ PP") 
4. (associativity) 
[Ed([); 1Jf]~Ed[([); 1JT] 
[[([); 1JT]; r]~[([); [llf; r]J 
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